Analysis;
By Deng Elijah,
Saturday, November 02, 2019(Nyamilepedia) — The recent statement by Dr. Riek Machar Teny, the designated First Vice President and the Chairman of the SPLM in Opposition, that “the SPLM/A(IO) do not want to be part of another shady deal”, which was based on a firsthand experience from 2015-16 peace agreement, has instigated unintended but expected uproars among the South Sudanese populations, especially in Juba and across social media. On one hand, Machar’s statement has extremely outraged, disheartened and distressed “the government”, now left in pain and anguish of grief strolling from statement to statement, media to media and city to city hoping to convince whoever may lend an ear to persuade the main armed opposition leader, Dr. Riek Machar Teny, to consent to the formation of the Revitalized Transitional Government of National Unity on November 12th, 2019.
On the other hand, Dr. Riek Machar, Dr. Lam Akol, Pagan Amum, other opposition leaders and their parties do not want the government to be formed by November 12, 2019. Precisely, they demand an extension of the pre-transitional period by at least three months to ensure that the pre-transitional arrangement mechanisms are implemented as stipulated in the Peace Agreement (R-ARCSS) before the Revitalized Transitional Government of National Unity could be formed – unless by miracles the parties complete the implementation of the remaining provisions within the next 10 days. Whether or not the government should be formed by November 12th, 2019 is a question of whether the provisions of the Pre-Transitional period have been successfully implemented or not. This analysis aims to scrutinize the major provisions of the Pre-Transitional Period that should determine whether the RTGNU should be formed by November 12th or not. So bear with me!.
Part I: If The RTGNU Were To Be Formed on November 12, 2019
Although the ordinary citizens, who are living in deplorable conditions and direly need peace, are left stranded in a blame game of who is right and who is wrong, and whether the government should be formed or not, it is important to enlighten the South Sudanese and friends to understand that it is not just a matter of forming a new government for the sake of it or a question of forming a new government by a specific deadline but rather a question of meeting the stipulated prereqs before the agreed deadline so that another 2 millions people do not get displaced and tens of thousands of lives and property are not jeopardized, killed or destroyed, as we witnessed when security arrangement was circumvented in 2016 leading to a dogfight with irreconcilable aftermaths .
In propositional logic, this conditional dilemma where one condition or a premise leads to another, requires a simple rule of inference known as Modus Ponens [read as “if p then q”], which implies that as long as p is true then q must be true otherwise q is false. In the case of South Sudan, the November 12th deadline or any future deadline is dependent on the provisions of that period and they[deadlines] can only be met, if and only if, the provisions of the Pre-Transitional Period are implemented, PERIOD. The parties cannot form the Revitalized Transitional Government of National Unity(RTGNU) whether in November, 2019 or in June, 2020 unless the General Provisions Applicable during the Pre-transitional period or as provided for in article 1.4 of the Revitalized Agreement on the Resolution of the Conflict in South Sudan(R-ARCSS) are implemented.
Thus, what the South Sudanese should demand to know at the moment are the major provisions that should have been undertaken during the last 13 months of the pre-transitional period and whether they were implemented or not. According to article 1.4.3 the activities that were supposed to be implemented during the agreed eight (8) months Pre–Transitional Period, include but are not limited to:
Article 1.4.3.1 reads “Dissemination of the Revitalised ARCSS to South Sudanese people inside the country, in different cities and refugee camps in neighbouring countries, and in the Diaspora, so that the people can understand, support and own it”
Was this article implemented? NO! Instead of President Salva Kiir, Dr. Riek Machar and other opposition leaders to work hand in hand to disseminate the Revitalized ARCSS to South Sudanese within the three regions of South Sudan and also in the neighboring countries and diaspora, the government tried to substitute this article and article 1.4.3.3 (below) with what they call the “National Dialogue” that never materialized. In brief, this article was not implemented and therefore RARCSS has not been disseminated, and as such the people neither understand nor own and support the peace deal.
Article 1.4.3.2 reads “Carrying out the tasks entrusted to the Technical Boundary Committee (TBC), Independent Boundaries Commission (IBC), and 5 the Referendum Commission on Number and Boundaries of States (RCNBS)”
Did these committees resolve the states and boundaries controversy? Obviously NO and Salva Kiir has just formed yet another committee. Historically speaking, or dating back to October 2, 2015, when Salva Kiir first introduced his 28 states, half of which were allocated to his Dinka tribe, the main purpose of these controversial states was not only to grab non-Dinka land and creates more cross-border conflicts but specifically to derail any chance of peace and political stability in the country. Time and again, dictators create inter-ethnic wars to divert attention from political conflicts to ethnic wars.
In the case of South Sudan, with these 32 states, President Kiir has a chance to create more wars be it between different tribes or within the same tribes and also between the government and the opposition parties who are opposed to this controversial idea. Again, the intention is crystal clear – to maintain muddy status quo. Therefore, this idea is the best deal breaker the regime ever thought of and as long as Salva Kiir wants to cling on a shady power, he will never reverse the decree that created these states. Instead they will only intensify this campaign to inflict more wounds on the victims and those who are opposed to this idea.
Unless the opposition change their thin line of thinking and come up with more effective strategies on how to encounter this idea, this article alone will hold the country hostage for a few years to come, which is exactly the position the government wants to trap the opposition into while the kleptocrats continue to loot resources, print more money and ride the country to hell. Afterall, they got absolutely nothing to lose!
Article 1.4.3.3 reads “A process of national healing and reconciliation that shall be led by the Parties, faith based groups and civil society groups inside and outside of the Republic of South Sudan.” Again, this article was not implemented!
As stipulated in this article, a process of national healing and reconciliation should have been established and led by the parties to the agreement, faith based groups and civil society; however, the regime instead established its own mini initiatives such as the national day of prayers, prayers in J1, national dialogue and other alternative initiatives or selected mechanisms that were neither inclusive nor groundbreaking. If anything, the only prayers that shaded some lights of hope were the prayers at the Vatican City, Holy See, under the auspice of Pope Francis and other spiritual leaders but again this was all watered down before the leaders arrived in Africa. Still this initiative was not inclusive and should never have substituted but complemented a nationwide national healing and reconciliation.
Article 1.4.3.4: The agreed security arrangement activities;
The agreed security arrangement activities include demilitarization of the civilians centers, cantonment, training and merging of at least 83,000 forces which was later scaled down to 50% of 83,000. So far all these activities are at the most basic step, which is cantonment and registration of forces and recently President Kiir has admitted that it is his fault because he did not authorize the release of the funding for these implementations. The only progress that was announced very recently is the training and graduation of some of the military trainers that would be deployed to train the unified army. This process has been very slow and even if it is completed without adequate supply of food, mosquito nets, water, and other basic needs, military and political will, soldiers will desert such cantonments..
Other important provisions of the pre-transitional period include article 1.4.3.5, which deals with the incorporation of the Revitalised ARCSS in the Transitional Constitution of the Republic of South Sudan, 2011 (as amended) and article 1.4.3.6 which calls for reviewing and drafting of necessary bills as per the Revitalised ARCSS.
In sum, these activities and other essential mechanisms are not implemented, particularly because the government did not release the agreed budget and Salva Kiir has attested to this the other day. This was done strategically to cripple the peace agreement. Therefore if President Salva Kiir or any other rubber stamp organ wanted the Revitalized Transitional Government of National Unity to be formed on time, then they should have invested all the little resources on the critical provisions of the peace agreement. Unfortunately the unfit government prioritized giving money to members of parliament to buy luxurious V8 vehicles, buying presidential jet for Salva Kiir, purchasing military hardwares, constructions of roads in Bhar el Ghazal, paying hotel bills, bribing international firms to block establishment of the Hybrid Court and sending huge delegations abroad.
It’s therefore a mere misrepresentation of facts to blame Riek Machar or any other opposition groups that has no significant control over resources. In fact the SPLM/A(IO) gave up its control of the contested Unity State Oil Fields which adds 60,000 barrels a day and that bumped up oil production from 120, 000 barrels a day to 180,000. The extra 60, 000 barrels of oil per day should have been enough to fund the peace agreement but that hasn’t been the case. Whom to blame?
You can read:
The Full Article (part I, II and III) HERE;
Part III here.
The author, Deng Elijah, is the Chief Executive Director of Nyamilepedia. For information regarding this specific article he can be reached through his email at dengsimon2000 at yahoo dot com or through Nyamilepedia at nyamilepedia@gmail.com. For short opinion articles and ideas, you can follow Deng on Facebook and Twitter by liking his personal page at Deng Elijah .
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