REFORMS: JOINT FEDERAL POLICE IN THE NATIONAL CAPITAL

SPLM/SPLA POSITION
ON
JOINT FEDERAL POLICE IN THE NATIONAL CAPITAL
ADDIS ABABA, ETHIOPIA
AUGUST 28, 2014
SPLM-SPLA

JOINT FEDERAL POLICE
1. The Joint Federal Police Command (JFPC):

1.1. JFPC shall be composed and structured on parity basis and take its decisions by consensus, in case of disagreement, the matter shall be referred to the two Principals. It shall be composed of the Chief of Police of SPLM/SPLA and Inspector General of Police of GRSS, their deputies and four senior officers from each party.

1.2. JFPC shall exhibit a characteristic of well-functioning body capable of timely response to tasks and situation.

1.3. JFPC shall have a Technical Committee to be formed from four senior officers from both parties.

1.4. The Technical Committee shall undertake the duty of coordination between the two police forces and resolve different problems that may ensue. It shall report regularly to JFPC in all ordinary and extraordinary sessions.

1.5. The two Principals shall appoint the Commander and the deputy commander of the Joint Federal Capital Police (JFCP) who shall be ex officio members of JFPC.

1.6. JFPC shall be entrusted to work out a comprehensive framework for confidence building measures between SPLM/SPLA and GRSS Police forces.

1.7. At the earliest opportunity, appointed representatives of SPLM/SPLA and GRSS will determine a staff structure in support of JFPC.

1.8. JFPC shall prepare budget.

  1. The Status of Joint Federal Capital Police (JFCP):

2.1. There shall be formed Joint Federal Capital Police (hereinafter referred to as JFCP) during the pre-transitional and the transitional period from SPLM/SPLA and GRSS police to replace the current police forces in the capital.

2.2. Formation, training, tasking and deployment of JFCP formations and sub-formations shall be completed not later than D-day + 1 month.

2.3. At the inception, JFCP shall remain in their joint form. However, the process of full integration shall be completed by D day + 7 months.

2.4. JFCP as per Agreement on Security Arrangements shall fall under the command of the Joint Federal Police Command (JFPC). Nevertheless, the two Principals shall appoint the commander and deputy commander for the JFCP as the highest level who shall, by virtue of their positions be members of JFPC. They shall oversee routine command matters of JFCP in accordance to authority conferment by JFPC.

2.5. JFCP command shall be exercised on parity basis between SPLM/SPLA and GRSS officers with alternation of roles at the uppermost and other levels of command.

2.6 JFCP personnel shall be treated equally. There shall be uniformity in welfare, salaries, emoluments, pension rights, supplies, armament, and equipment.

2.7 Training of the Joint Federal Capital Police (JFCP):

2.7.1. Both Forces (SPLM/SPLA and GRSS) shall complete selection and organization of police officers, Non-Commissioned Officers (NCOs) and men for JFCP within D Day +1 month from the beginning of the pre-transitional period.

2.7.2. JFCP components from both Parties shall be formed within D Day +1 month from the pre-transitional period and co-locate in their various training centers to be trained for not less than six (6) months (in phases) after which they shall be integrated.

2.7.3. There shall be developed a joint doctrine, code of conduct, as well as disciplinary laws, regulations, and standing operating procedures to govern JFCP general training policies, programs, disciplinary scopes and behavioral patterns during the Peace Talks and be signed as part of security arrangement agreement.

2.7.4. In view of special status of the Federal Capital Ramchiel, JFCP Command shall allot tasks to JFCP contingents that shall be deployed to the capital by the end of the pre-transitional period after completion of initial joint training session that shall not exceed one (1) month. Nonetheless, JFCP command shall organize further training sessions for these contingents in accordance to JFCP training policy and programs.

2.7.5. The parties shall appeal to the international community to render additional technical, material and financial support to assist in forming and training JFCP.

2.8 JFCP Command and Control:
JFCP Headquarters is under command of JFPC and shall be located in Ramchiel. The JFCP command shall perform among other things, the following duties and responsibilities:

2.8.1. Command of JFCP formations and units;

2.8.2. Promotion of mutual cooperation between JFCP, SPLM/SPLA and GRSS at all command levels;

2.8.3. Coordination of supply and replenishments plans with JFPC;

2.8.4. Implementation of JFPC plans, policies, programs and directives pertaining to JFCP;

2.8.5. Appointment and transfer of JFCP officers within the discretion of JFCP command;

2.8.6. Create and promote confidence building measures;

2.8.7. Development and execution of training programs for JFCP;

2.8.8. Coordination with Ceasefire Political Commission (CPC);

2.8.9. Resolution of disputes that may arise within JFCP jurisdiction.

2.9. JFCP Commanders shall exercise the following authority/responsibility:

2.9.1. Command and control of JFCP in their respective areas of command;

2.9.2. Implementation of and compliance with the directives of the JFCP Higher Headquarters;

2.9.3. Implement confidence building policies of the higher headquarters as well as create and promote confidence building measures within their power as shall be desirable;

2.9.4. Development and execution of training programs within their command jurisdiction;

2.9.5. Performance of any other duties that may be conferred upon them by the higher headquarters.

2.10. JFCP Composition and organization:

2.10.1 Composition:

2.10.1.1. JFCP shall be formed from SPLM/SPLA and GRSS police forces;

2.10.2 Organization:

2.10.2.1. JFCP shall be comprised of a Brigade and two battalions (see organizational structure attached as annexure 4) deployed in the Federal Capital and shall be as follows:

a) 1st battalion which shall have a total strength of 851 officers, NCOs and men (Police).

b) 2nd battalion which shall have a total strength of 851 officers, NCOs and men (Police).

c) 3rd battalion which shall have a total strength of 851 officers, NCOs and men (Police).

d) 4th battalion which shall have a total strength of 851 officers, NCOs and men (Prisons),

e) 5th battalion which shall have a total strength of 851 officers, NCOs and men (Wildlife).

f) 6th battalion which shall have a total strength of 851 officers, NCOs and men (All Joint Federal Police Specialized Units).

2.10.2.2. The police battalion shall compose of:

2.10.2.2.1. Battalion Command;

2.10.2.2.2. Battalion HQ Company;

2.10.2.2.3. Four police companies;

2.10.2.2.4. Support Company.

20.10.2.4. JFCP battalion shall be formed of two SPLM/SPLA companies and two GRSS companies, whereas the HQs Company and the support company shall be mixed. The size of the forces in each locality shall not exceed one police battalion.

2.10.2.5 Oil installations shall be demilitarized and be protected by Joint Federal Police (JFP). In case of any threat to the oil installations, the Parties agree that Joint Presidential Guard (JPG) shall assist the JFP to protect the oil fields.

  1. Funding of the Joint Federal Police:

3.1. During the Transitional Period, the Joint Federal Police (SPLM/SPLA, GRSS and JFCP) shall be funded by the Federal Government. To meet this obligation, the TFGONU shall raise additional financial resources from International Partners (IGAD, Troika, AU, UN and China).

  1. Other Policing Issues and Domestic Security in the States

4.1. In order to facilitate the removal and withdrawal of the military and paramilitary forces from areas where they were previously located and in order to return societal order and harmony, in accordance with the law, in compliance with national and international acceptable standards and with accountability to the Courts and civil Administration, the police at the appropriate level during the ceasefire shall:

5.1. Maintain law and public order;

5.2. Ensure safety and security of all people and their property;

5.3. Prevent and detect crimes.

5.4. Assist returnees and the displaced to start a normal, stable and safe life in their respective communities;

5.5. Provide national service {such as nationality, civil registry, identity documents (IDs), passports etc.} and other police services and make them available to all citizens in their locations;

5.6. Protect VIPs in collaboration with other security agencies;

5.7. Protect and preserve natural resources;

5.8. Combat illicit trafficking in narcotics, drugs and illegal trade in firearms and other organized and trans-boundary crimes in the area;

5.9. Control illegal presence and movement of aliens in the area;

5.10. Collect data and information on criminal matters that threaten implementation of the peace agreement in the area.

5.11. Ensure re-deployment of military and para-military forces outside villages, communities and city streets;

5.12. Help combat corruption at all levels of government and civil society; and

5.13. In order to strengthen the effective implementation of this Agreement, the Federal Police may assist, as required, other police at all levels to establish and promote police service at that level;

5.14. Cooperate and participate in the entire process of ceasefire implementation;

6.1. The Parties agree that the police shall assume their normal functions and duties particularly in the areas where military and para-military forces had previously assumed their functions;

6.2. The Parties call upon the international partners to assist in the areas of training, establishment and capacity building of Joint Federal Police and other law enforcement agencies for the sustenance of peace and rule of law;

7.1. The Parties recognize the need for cooperation and coordination mechanism between the Joint Federal Police and other law enforcement agencies at all levels with regards to the implementation of this Agreement.

SPLM/SPLA© 2014

A Big Question On IGAD Neutrality Over South Sudan Peace Talks:

By David Lony Majak:

Opinion

The photo IGAD secretariats and members on tweets web site.

The photo IGAD secretariats and members on tweets web site.

 September 1st 2014(Nyamilepedia)   It is now making nine 9 months down the road (plus fifteen days of December), the big question of thoughts on IGAD neutrality over south Sudan peace deal in the capital of Ethiopia, Addis Ababa, is a sign of failure to resolve conflict between the warring parties.

The Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) has played a card of negative neutrality over South Sudan crisis; peace talk have been an ongoing process for nine months without any positive solution to resolve the problem between the warring parties in the Republic of South Sudan. What are they after for real?

The IGAD board needs to re-study the objectives of peace building on how to strike a balance between ‘negative’ peace and ‘positive’ peace deal. Because conflicts usually leave their mark on the post-settlement process in form of broken lives, shattered and divided communities, distrust, and hatred. The task of re-constructing a self-sustaining peace is never an easy one because today in south Sudan, so many lives have been lost and continuing being lost up to date.

I believe before the war broke out over SPLM powers girded, South Sudan had been an independent Nation comprised of three primary groups – the greater Upper Nile region (northeast), Bahr el Ghazal region (northwest) and Equatoria region (southerner). The secondary indicators are 10 states with 86 countries. These three regions have got different tribes within although some are dominated by majority members of the tribes. South Sudan has been quieter a greater nation before it was recognized as an independent state in 2011. But the societies of south Sudan were not completely free of internal disputes for power, the three groups got along, sharing a common culture, religion, language, and set of values and taboos as well especially; the Dinkas, Nuer and their brother Shilluk has cultural relativism in South Sudan.

About IGAD, One of the reason may be that they overlooked this fact could be the bureaucratic professional orientation of the warring parties over South Sudan conflict. These are neither social scientists nor cultural experts; but they got engaged in their office as long as they are paid with definite roles and responsibilities. Therefore they understood peace process as it was described in different peace categories, but failed to accord peace and to understand the underlying realities that contributed to the making of that peace settlement.

In South Sudan during its autonomy government of CPA implementation between the southerner south Sudan and Sudan the then; it was survey that discrimination and unequal access to scare resources led to violence, as the discrimination took place along ethnic lines, and the violence and counter violence became ethnic ton of positive humiliations amongst the minority tribes which do not even have representatives in the government institutions. There were superimpositions of social cleavages with fault lines in political power, economic wealth, and ethnicity reinforcing each other. This conflict started before 2010 elections and has continued until today.

IGAD body didn’t understood the Root causes of conflict in South Sudan

The IGAD peace mediation team should clearly understand that; there is no smoke without fire; this mean south Sudan crisis is not just a conflict of no root causes. The worth number one factor is the;-

  1. Divisive & dictatorship leadership: The leaders of the country’s political camps have engaged in demagogic rhetoric which has sometimes incited violence from some points of view in South Sudan.
  2. State monopoly of resources: The population is preponderantly rural and engaged in subsistence agriculture where there is no government support and initiatives for farmers. The country’s small industrial sector is confined largely to local production or uncompetitive exports such as oil and gold, produced until recently by state industries. Control of state power almost coincides with control of economic resources which caused so many failures on economic sector.
  3. Past discrimination: Since independence in CPA 2005/2011, some tribes dominated regimes have discriminated against others.
  4. Weight of a violent history: South Sudanese’s post independence history is strewn with recurrent whether there was a coup or attempted coups which leaded to the inter-communal violence in the country. Clashes that took place in 2005 until 2013 have caused mistrust amongst different tribes in South Sudan. This sequence of massacres has created a culture of violence which is hard to dissolve in South Sudan.
  5. Unequal distribution of public resources and discriminative employment of youth in the government institutions.
  6. Traditional and cultural grouping on political institutions when lobbying for powers, unequal representation in the national level.

In a thorough political analysis over peace mediation; African nations have been ravaged by conflict, resulting in destabilization, displacement, and infrastructural destructions, all of which have based genders-specific consequences. In South Sudan today, for example, an estimated 75% of South Sudanese IDPs leaving in the country’s UNMISS camps and refugees in different countries are women and children. This IGAD team and other stakeholders should evaluate the post conflict and conflict resolution in South Sudan in order to find the immediate solution to the problem, with particular focus on Sudan and South Sudan conflict references. IGAD has been a role model on African issues and have performed so many an important roles as peace negotiators and peace educators in both Countries and regions in the continent of Africa. Therefore; IGAD board should finally, impose and to suggest ideas to integrate into conflict resolution and peace building efforts so that South Sudan receives peace deal again.

The columnist can be reached on delonymajak@gmail.com, (leave it or take it).

The World Know IGAD is Bunch of Idiots and, Assortment of Individual Illegitimates Leaders Even in Their Countries.

By. Mak Banguot Gok,

Opinion.

The IGAD heads of state observing the chief negotiators recommitting to January and May CoH agreements(Photo: file)

The IGAD heads of state observing the chief negotiators recommitting to January and May CoH agreements(Photo: file)

Sept 1, 2014(Nyamilepedia) — The eight-nation grouping in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia for long period of nine (9) months have just revealed their true colors as bunch of idiots and a collection of a poor African leaders whose their decision always stimulate  by money and accustomed dependency on scandalous projects on the regions. Every man jack who is vis-à-vis in the suffering of the people of South Sudan is mindful that; IGAD has no capacity to be able to handle a situation on the region which counting ethnic cleansing and crime against humanity. Nuer and others human species still believing in the fact that, the issue of over 20,000 unarmed Nuer civilians massacred in Juba by the Salva Kiir’s tribal army shouldn’t be settle in cheap reasoning as what the so-called IGAD envoy have come up with after all the times on wasting money and dynamism to bring to an end the bloodiest conflict in the new nation.  The world appreciated Dr. Riek Machar of not signing such pompous smuggled in papers.   It gave us, the Nuer and the movement that we are leading against brutal dictator in Juba a value. People that, we really have reason to fight a genocidal government in Juba.

Our leaders were,  instead, awarded a huge  credits of  not being fools by fake IGAD leaders who care of only money and wealth acquired by using blood of innocents citizens in the name of the States . The IGAD proposed transitional government will not advance such decent values. As a substitute, it will lead to a political defrayal that fortifies the contemporary genocidal regime, rebuffs the Nuer who is victims of the ferocity in an expedition for impartiality, and condenses dogmatic transformation extraneous. In realism, it would not be genuine to expect the IGAD to bring about a meaningful peace agreement for South Sudan.

IGAD if it is a credible to work out for meaningful resolution has also yet to make good its repeated threats to levy sanctions against South Sudanese leaders, and not just producing cheap conclusion, they should have to judge who is responsible for prolonging an eight-month tribal war that has taken at least over 20,000 lives of an innocent Nuer unarmed civilians at the edge of the conflict in Juba, and raised the spectra of famine. After all, IGAD is dysfunctional political body travail from its own inner headship crisis. It lacks articulate a political stratagem and conceptual lucidity to discourse the deep rooted chronological and political encounters of South Sudan. Without omission, all IGAD states are facing what many analyst called ‘’state-building and nation-building challenges’’ that, they are fishing for where to let their poor citizens easts. No matter, people of South Sudan continues suffering when their bankrupt government gets their share on the South Sudanese oil money. Museveni have once clearly stated that, ‘’the Ugandan Army is usable where we get food’’ which mean, UPDF is to dies everywhere Museveni says.

Another problem is, their ( the IGAD head of States) records on human rights, abuse to their own citizens, corruption, tribalism  and respect for democratic principles and practices are horrifying to say the least. Therefore, it is in their interests to maintain the status quo in South Sudan. In addition, it is in their political and economic interests to keep South Sudan as a weak, dysfunctional, and undemocratic state in need of continuous help from its East African neighbors. The popular phrase “African solutions for African problems” among African leaders is uplifting, but it has never been a workable premise.

It has failed in Sudan, Mali, and Central African Republic. Thus, it is worthless to expect IGAD to lead a peace process to rescue South Sudan from its imminent demise. It is the responsibility of the United Nations Security Council, Troika countries, in particular the United States, to engage directly in strengthening the peace process and devising a mechanism similar to the one that led to the signing of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement in 2005.

The United Nations and the United States have also not followed through on their own warnings that punishments will be forthcoming if peace is not achieved. “IGAD seems content to kick the can down the road,” remarked Richard Downie, deputy director of the Africa programme at the Washington-based Centre for Strategic and International Studies. “It has shown little fancy in discovery a justifiable solution to the crisis, relying instead on quick political fixes that do nothing to address the underlying causes of the conflict,” he added. The Nuer-lead Rebels aligned with former vice president Riek Machar have reason to distrust IGAD’s impartiality, added J Peter Pham, an Africa analyst at another Washington think tank. “Uganda’s heavy intervention on the side of President Salva Kiir and Kenya’s allowing the regime in Juba to restock arms, plus the economic interests of both countries in maintaining the status quo, clearly make it impossible for those opposed to the regime to view IGAD as a neutral force,” said Mr Pham who is also director of the Africa Centre at the Atlantic Council. “As a result, the only chance of the mediation working would be for IGAD, backed by the international community, to attempt to impose a resolution through forceful use of sanctions and other coercive measures.” This is to let the mighty Nuer not taking the recent threat against the Nuer-lead Revolution which will seeks solution to the current genocidal government of Dinka in Juba out of all the pretext of the so-called IGAD forum.

I know, it is very disenchanted to learn that, east African nations are at present leads by individual opportunists whose interests always amateur and, upended on the side which buttered their breads.  You heard of Seyum Masfin of Ethiopia, the so-called IGAD Envoy to South Sudan barking on the Nuer-lead rebellion and, pushing the leaders of the mighty SPLM/IO to accept that they had signed the Several documents which have been discussed, the key one in question being number (2) below, which the so-called IGAD negotiators considered as ‘one document’ together with documents (3) and (4) below: The original Cessation of Hostilities Agreement, signed by both parties on 23 January 2014 and has been severally breached by Salva Kiir’s government by keeping foreign soldiers in the country despite the pended issues of gravest human rights and crimes against humanity committed by Ugandan Army and others mercenaries who fought align his tribal soldiers throughout the nine months period of the conflict.

The Re-Dedication document, signed by both parties on 25 August 2014 which gave more consultation to the IGAD negotiators by both the government of Salva Kiir and the rebel. When we talks of Re- Dedication document, it mean not that the conclusion to the conflict is made. Simply, to reaffirm that, the two rivals’ parties are still interesting to solve the problem through peace and political means if, the so-called IGAD redirect the document which actually satisfied at least both sides. This was after rebel and the government raised complains of numerous irregularities on the imposed modalities on the document that is to be discussed by the sematic committee of both sides.  The ‘Implementation Matrix,’ annexed to the Re-Dedication document. Addendum to the Implementation Matrix, also annexed to the Re-Dedication document. Protocol on Principles on Transitional Arrangements, signed by Salva Kiir but not by Dr. Riek Machar is what we talks of today

Mak Banguot Gok can be reached via at makjohnson2005@yahoo.com

Nuer Youth Association in Australia Support Federal State of South Sudan

NYAA

 

Sept 1, 2014(Nyamilepedia) — On behalf of the Nuer Youth Association of Australia and on my own behalf, I would like to declare our unequivocal support to the call for restructuring the state of South Sudan on the basis of constitutional federalism. This is a long overdue governance system which our people through their ancestral representatives have been demanding and yearning for since 1947.

Federalism is the best system for South Sudan because it will address the current inequalities and centralized decision-making by allowing various administrative units to decentralize decision-making processes and promote equity in wealth-sharing.

A federal system of governance will also heal and strengthen the eroded sense of nationalism and unity among our people by turning the current diversities into sources of our pride and togetherness. This will diminish the tendency of tribalism or lust to dominate other ethnic communities using the state machinery.

Federalism is the appropriate system of governance that will reduce authoritarianism, and all forms of corruption and marginalization of small ethnic groups in South Sudan. We, in Australia have experienced the benefit of the federal system in this country of exemplary different nationalities. We believe that federalism will protect the interests of all the citizens and minority groups at both state and federal levels in South Sudan.

As the new chairperson for the Nuer youth Association of Australia, I will do my utmost and strive to mobilize the youth in cooperation and collaboration with other South Sudanese youth groups from other communities. This is to embrace the call by the SPLM in Opposition under the wise and able leadership of Dr. Riek Machar Teny-Dhurgon to establish a Federal Republic of South Sudan.

With federalism, people will not rush to the capital cities like Juba for the best treatment, employment, education, feeding, or transport because a sound federalized policy on development will take these services to the villages.

Federalism will give local and state governments the freedom and power to formulate policies best suited for their unique situations and to resolve their internal problems or challenges such as cattle rustling and land disputes which have been chronic sources of insecurity between tribes for decades across South Sudan.

I salute our martyrs who have lost and continue to lose their lives in tens of thousands because of the leadership of the ruthless and visionless dictator, Salva Kiir Mayardit, for their selfless sacrifices in order to achieve freedom, democracy and good governance in our young country. Their precious shed blood shall not have spilled in vain!

I therefore call on South Sudanese youth all over the world to support a federal system in South Sudan. We are the future generation, and therefore we need to think about what is good for us and our future.

Long Live Youth!

Long Live South Sudan!

Mr. Thalage Wal Goch

Chairperson,

Nuer Youth Association of Australia Inc.

REFORMS: JOINT NATIONAL SECURITY SERVICE IN THE NATIONAL CAPITAL

III
SPLM/SPLA POSITION
ON
JOINT NATIONAL SECURITY SERVICE
IN THE
NATIONAL CAPITAL
ADDIS ABABA, ETHIOPIA
AUGUST 28, 2014

SPLM-SPLA

JOINT NATIONAL SECURITY SERVICE

  1. The Joint National Security Service Command (JNSC):

1.1. Joint National Security Service (JNSS) shall be composed and structured on parity basis and take its decisions by consensus, in case of disagreement, the matter shall be referred to the two Principals. It shall be composed of the Directors General of SPLM/SPLA and GRSS National Security Services, their deputies and four senior officers from each party.

1.2. JNSC shall exhibit a characteristic of well-functioning body capable of timely response to tasks and situation.

1.3. JNSC shall have a Technical Committee to be formed from four senior officers from both parties.

1.4. The Technical Committee shall undertake the duty of coordination between the two National Security Services and resolve different problems that may ensue. It shall report regularly to JNSC in all ordinary and extraordinary sessions.

1.5. The two Principals shall appoint the Director General and the Deputy of the JNSS who shall be ex officio members of JNSC.

1.6. JNSC shall be entrusted to work out a comprehensive framework for confidence building measures between SPLM/SPLA and GRSS National Security Service Forces.

1.7. At the earliest opportunity, appointed representatives of SPLM/SPLA and GRSS will determine a staff structure in support of JNSC.

1.8 JNSC shall prepare budget.

2. The Status of Joint National Security Service (JNSS)

2.1. There shall be formed a Joint National Security Service (hereinafter referred to as JNSS) during the pre-transitional and the transitional period from SPLM/SPLA and GRSS National Security Services to replace the current forces.

2.2. Formation, training, tasking and deployment of JNSS formations and sub-formations shall be completed not later than D-day + 1 month.

2.3. At the inception, JNSS shall remain in their joint form. However, the process of full integration shall be completed by D day + 7 months.

2.4. JNSS as per Agreement on Security Arrangements shall fall under the command of the Joint National Security Service Command (JNSC). Nevertheless, the two Principals shall appoint the Director General and Deputy for the JNSS as the highest level who shall, by virtue of their positions, be members of JNSC. They shall oversee routine command matters of JNSS in accordance to authority conferment by JNSC.

2.5. JNSS command shall be exercised on parity basis between SPLM/SPLA and GRSS National Security Service officers with alternation of roles at the uppermost and other levels of command.

2.6 JNSS personnel shall be treated equally. There shall be uniformity in welfare, salaries, emoluments, pension rights, supplies, armament, and equipment.

2.7 Training of the Joint National Security Service (JNSS)

2.7.1. Both National Security Service forces (SPLM/SPLA and GRSS) shall complete selection and organization of officers, non-commissioned officers (NCOs) and men for JNSS within D Day +1 month from the beginning of the pre-transitional period.

2.7.2. JNSS components from both Parties shall be formed within D Day +1 month from the pre-transitional period and co-locate in their various training centers to be trained for not less than six (6) months (in phases) after which they shall be integrated.

2.7.3. There shall be developed a joint doctrine, code of conduct, as well as disciplinary laws, regulations, and standing operating procedures to govern JNSS general training policies, programs, disciplinary scopes and behavioral patterns during the Peace Talks and be signed as part of security arrangement agreement.

2.7.4. In view of special status of the Federal Capital Ramchiel, JNSS Command shall allot tasks to JNSS contingents that shall be deployed to the capital by the end of the pre-transitional period after completion of initial joint training session that shall not exceed one (1) month. Nonetheless, JNSS command shall organize further training sessions for these contingents in accordance to JNSS training policy and programs.

2.7.5. The parties shall appeal to the international community to render additional technical, material and financial support to assist in forming and training JNSS.

2.8 JNSS Command and Control:
JNSS Headquarters is under command of JNSC and shall be located in Ramchiel. The JNSC command shall perform among other things, the following duties and responsibilities:

2.8.1. Command of JNSS formations and units;

2.8.2. Promotion of mutual cooperation between JNSS, SPLM/SPLA and GRSS at all command levels;

2.8.3. Coordination of supply and replenishments plans with JNSS;

2.8.4. Implementation of JNSC plans, policies, programs and directives pertaining to JNSS;

2.8.5. Appointment and transfer of JNSS officers within the discretion of JNSS command;

2.8.6. Create and promote confidence building measures;

2.8.7. Development and execution of training programs for JNSS.

2.8.8. Coordination with Ceasefire Political Commission (CPC);

2.8.9. Resolution of disputes that may arise within JNSS jurisdiction.

2.9. JNSS Leadership shall exercise the following authority/responsibility:

2.9.1. Command and control of JNSS in their respective areas of command;

2.9.2. Implementation of and compliance with the directives of the JNSS Higher Headquarters;

2.9.3. Implement confidence building policies of the higher headquarters as well as create and promote confidence building measures within their power as shall be desirable;

2.9.4. Development and execution of training programs within their command jurisdiction;

2.9.5. Performance of any other duties that may be conferred upon them by the higher headquarters.

2.10. JNSS Composition and organization:

2.10.1 Composition:

2.10.1.1. JNSS shall be formed from SPLM/SPLA and GRSS National Security Services forces;

2.10.2 Organization:

2.10.2.1. JNSS shall be a Brigade and a battalion (see organizational structure attached as annexure 4) deployed in the Federal Capital and the states and shall be as follows:

a) 1st battalion which shall have a total strength of 851 officers, NCOs and men (internal security).

b) 2nd battalion which shall have a total strength of 851 officers, NCOs and men (internal security).

c) 3rd battalion which shall have a total strength of 851 officers, NCOs and men (internal security),

d) 4th battalion which shall have a total strength of 851 officers, NCOs and men (internal security).

e) 5th battalion which shall have a total strength of 851 officers, NCOs and men (external security).

2.10.2.2. The JNSS battalion shall compose of:

2.10.2.2.1. Battalion command;

2.10.2.2.2. Battalion HQ company;

2.10.2.2.3. Four companies;

2.10.2.2.4. Technical company.

20.10.2.4. JNSS battalion shall be formed of two SPLM/SPLA companies and two GRSS companies, whereas the HQs Company and the technical company shall be mixed. The size of the forces in each locality shall not exceed one battalion.

2.10.2.5. JNSS shall assist the Joint Federal Police (JFP) in the protection oil installation.

  1. Funding of the Joint National Security Service:

3.1. During the Transitional Period, the joint National Security Service (SPLM/SPLA and GRSS) shall be funded by the Federal Government. To meet this obligation, the TFGONU shall raise additional financial resources from International Partners (IGAD, Troika, AU, UN and China).

SPLM/SPLA© 2014

The IGAD Led Peace Talk Should Be About The People of South Sudan Rather Than The Leaders

Africa Speak

Communiqué from Africa Speaks
The IGAD led Peace Talk should be about the people of South Sudan rather than the
leaders

Pretoria, SOUTH AFRICA

Sept 1, 2014(Nyamilepedia) — We appreciate the IGAD effort in bringing all concerned parties to discuss and to resolve eight month old conflict in the heart of east Africa, we do understand that how difficult it could be the negotiation process and bringing amicable solution for all.

Moreover the strategy and the center of such effort should be embryonic on the people of South Sudan rather than to meet the interest of the leaders. As we all know the long fight for freedom, justice, equality, prosperity, development, peace and tranquility shouldn’t turn chaos, misery, and hopelessness.

The peace talk is a prospect for South Sudanese to engage in peace and reconciliation to have a common understanding of nationhood, likewise this is a virtuous platform to have long lasting peace agreement framework and to take South Sudan in the road of transformation of Peace and Development for the people by the people.

To bring just, sustainable, permanent and lasting solution in South Sudan we have look the root cause of the very conflict; all involved parties in this peace process have to strain to address the root cause of the problem and they have to embed the explications in to the peace framework agreement by consulting all parties and specially the agreement should be people
centric.

Currently in the country one of the major challenge is to bringing about good governance, rule of law, justice, equality, and stability, which is a primary tool for socio-economic, and national security transformation.

We believe that one of the fundamental of this peace talks should be creating a sustainable development by considering the constitutional processes as a corner stone of the country, which gives a freedom for citizens. Equally important justice, accountability and healing process are among the key components.

Constitutionalism for South Sudan citizens willformulate and enforce fair, just and universal rules of social conduct; citizens will be able to live at peace with one another in positive and productive collaboration.
We call upon all parties of South Sudanese to look the national interest ahead of their immediate political ambitions. Correspondingly IGAD should look long-term solution rather than short-term fix.

Let us advance South Sudanese Aspiration of peaceful nationhood‼

South Sudan Government Seeks Military Intervention From China!

Updated at 6:25pm, Aug 31, 2014(PST).

Salva Kiir in China in 2012 on a trip to borrow loans from the Chinese government. China declined but referred Salva Kiir to a private company that was kicked out of Juba in January 2012(Photo: supllied)

Salva Kiir in China in 2012 on a trip to borrow loans from the Chinese government. China declined but referred Salva Kiir to a private company that was kicked out of Juba in January 2012(Photo: supllied)

August 31, 2014(Nyamilepedia) — An advanced government delegation from the war-torn South Sudan heads to Beijing to persuade the Chinese government to intervene militarily in the oil fields.

Reliable sources from Juba, narrated to Nyamilepedia that the delegation, headed by the country’s foreign affairs minister, Dr. Benjamin Marial, arrived in Beijing, China to seek military support.

“Yes, Marial is talking to Chinse government. This time the government decided to call for direct military intervention in the oil fields. The government said it can’t start the production in Unity state and Jonglei too because they fear rebel attacks. We will see what China can offer” said the delegate, who preferred to speak on condition of anonymity.

“Having a Chinese force will encourage the Chinese workers to drill oil from the ground. So the government is giving it a try. China is supportive of military means. you never know they may help” the delegate continued.

An advanced delegation, led by the country’s vice president, Wani Igga, visited China as Dr. Marial returned from Moscow, Russia, at the end of June. The visit discussed cooperation between the two countries, however, it later emerged that China is servicing both the peace and war in the devastated state.

China is internationally condemned for fueling the war with “big guns”, worth millions of dollars. China  also provides the country with high interest loans.

Reports from Bloomberg News indicates that South Sudan has spent more than one billion US dollars on weapons in the last eight months.

According to leaked documents submitted to Nyamilepedia, South Sudan has purchased weapons worth 38 million dollars from China in the recent past.

The recent visit to China came after South Sudan government failed to restore oil production in Jonglei and Unity states. Unity state oil fields were seized by the armed opposition at the beginning of the current civil war in December last year.

Juba planned to oust the rebels from the states and commence oil production in July, however, war remains at the heart of the capital, Bentiu. The two warring parties have continued to attack one another in Bentiu, Guit, Rubkoni and Mayom countyuntil last week.

A UN helicopter had met controversial crash near Bentiu last week, killing three Russians: one commander, flight engineer and flight attendant. The warring parties blame each other for the downing of the MI jet.

The Russian airline UTair reiterates that it was a deliberate ground-to-air missile from one of the notorious warring parties.

UTair, which has operated in the country since 1991 has shutdown flights to Unity state as the investigation are still on going, however, Juba believes that a full military intervention from the Chinese’s communist party regime would restore hopes and oil production would increase in the oil rich impoverished nation.

In May, the United State special envoy to the country confirmed that oil production has gone down by nearly 50%.

“The conflict at this point has resulted in a reduction by almost half of oil output from South Sudan,” Ambassador Donald Booth

By May, oil production dropped by nearly 160,000 barrels per day from its usual 245,000 barrels a day. The dropped in oil production has increased defections in the army as soldiers go unpaid for 3 to 6 months.

Before the war broke out, South Sudan’s populations depend nearly 98% on oil revenues. Today, the country anticipates one of the worst famines, as president Kiir acknowledges on BBC, however, very insignificant progresses have been registered to avert the catastrophes.

Whereas Sudan takes nearly 58% of the revenues for its pipelines and transport services, Chinese economy counts on 5% of the impoverished South’s oil. However, China tries to give back through expensive loans and peace mediation.

China has sent its 12th batch mission to support the UN peace keepers in the country, however, it is yet to be verified if China will send a different batch to the oil fields.

South Sudan government seek military support from Sudan, Egypt, Russia, Arab League, Zimbabwe, and any willing partners, to intervene in the oil fields, however, the international community and the United Nations call, contrarily,  for an arm embargo on the warring parties.

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China seeks bigger footprint in South Sudan

The Cable: U.N. Peacekeepers to Protect China’s Oil Interests in South Sudan

China sends 12th batch of peacekeeping force to South Sudan

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